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Mortgage loans and access
to housing for low-income
households in Latin America
Gerardo M. Gonzales Arrieta
On the basis of a study on mortgage loan options available in
eight Latin American countries, this article identifies two pending tasks
for most of the countries: the need to make long-term funds available to
mitigate the risk of a mismatch of maturities and rates, and the need to
harmonize profitability criteria for lenders with the criterion of access to
credit for the low-income population. The paper recommends the
creation of linkages between the housing finance market and the capital
market through secondary mortgage markets, for which the housing
finance market must use instruments other than subsidies. In addition,
the paper proposes a number of options to ensure that the State helps to
create mortgage markets that will provide the low-income population with
better access to housing.





C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 5  •  A P R I L  2 0 0 5
MORTGAGE LOANS AND ACCESS TO HOUSING FOR LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS




  This article is an abridged version of a study of the same title
published by ECLAC in the Financiamiento del Desarrollo series
(ECLAC, 2002). The opinions expressed herein are the exclusive
responsibibily of the author.
The financing of housing is a key element of any
housing policy. In general, two objectives should be
taken into account in order to make finance options
viable and sustainable. First, the options should offer
profitability to market participants; otherwise, it will
not be feasible to attract investment, particularly private
investment, to the housing sector. Secondly, they
should be adapted to the potential borrowers’ ability
to pay; otherwise, the low-income population will be
marginalized from market operations.
Since these two objectives are not necessarily
compatible, the State has at various times become a key
player; this has often resulted in a paternalistic
approach and an inappropriate allocation of resources
—with loans being granted at subsidized interest
rates— together with inefficient recovery of funds and
serious problems of payment arrears.
Other schemes have also been tried with the aim
of making more room for private management in the
construction and financing of housing, reserving for the
State, at least in theory, the role of basically regulating
and subsidizing the purchasing power of the lower-
income strata. To that end, State intervention has
focused on the contribution of direct, non-reimbursable
subsidies, with the prerequisite of prior savings on the
part of beneficiary families. Since this system is
frequently inadequate to allow low-income families to
purchase the kind of housing they want or can afford,
these two sources of financing are supplemented by
some type of housing credit.
The provision of mortgage loans on more
appropriate terms for low-income families, however,
has not been an easy task. In general, institutional
schemes for mobilizing resources for housing have not
made long-term funds available, although housing
finance involves precisely this type of time frame. The
availability of short-term funds, basically family
savings, has not formed a stable basis for housing
finance systems; rather it has created potential —and
often real— risks of a mismatch of maturities and rates.
Moreover, the relatively limited development of capital
markets has also had a negative impact by weakening
the linkages between these markets and the financing
of housing.
Furthermore, the small amounts involved in
mortgage loan operations for low-income sectors and
the high transaction costs with respect to these amounts
has tended, given the competitive scenario, to
discourage financial intermediaries from granting
mortgage loans to these sectors. In other words, many
of the market-based mortgage options are, in practice,
mainly available to the higher-income sectors.
This paper proposes a series of considerations on
the functioning of available mortgage options in a
sample of eight Latin American countries,1 and policy
recommendations to help develop the housing finance
markets and enhance their impact on access to housing,
especially for low-income sectors.
Section II below discusses the conceptual aspects
of resource mobilization for housing, taking into
account various institutional and operational models
and considering their implications for the functioning
of intermediaries and the management of their risks,
on the one hand, and the linkages between housing
markets and financial and capital markets, on the other.
In view of the dual objective —profitability and
accessibility— of any mortgage instrument, and the
predominance in Latin America of large population
sectors with low purchasing power, a theoretical
1
 The countries considered in the study are: Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru.
Besides the availability of information, other criteria used to form
the sample were: geographical distribution (five South American,
one Central American, one North American and one Caribbean
country); economic size (two large countries: Brazil and Mexico;
three medium-sized countries: Chile, Colombia and Peru; and three
small countries: Costa Rica, Ecuador and Dominican Republic); and
institutional aspects that affect the housing sector: (for example,
one country, Ecuador, is legally dollarized); another, Peru, is de
facto dollarized; three countries (Chile, Colombia and Mexico)
currently have indexation systems; one country, Brazil, has some
indexation experience; and two countries (Costa Rica and the
Dominican Republic) have no indexation tradition. The study also
includes an analysis of two other countries —Argentina, an
economically large South American country with, until recently, a
convertibility system, and Panama, an economically small Central
American country with a dollarized system— with regard to the
development of secondary mortgage markets.
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analysis is made of the contribution of housing
subsidies to the demand for easier access to housing.
On the basis of existing institutional mortgage
schemes and instruments, section III formulates a series
of conclusions and policy recommendations for
developing a type of housing finance management that
FIGURE 1
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may lead to an efficient and sustainable expansion of
mortgage markets, and may also effectively enable
low-income sectors to gain access to housing. Special
attention is given to the State’s role in the development
of mortgage markets and the enhancement of access
to housing and financing for low-income sectors.
II
Housing credit: conceptual aspects
1. Models for financial resource mobilization for
housing
Housing is a durable good; it is perhaps the most
important physical asset for the majority of family
units, and its price is usually several times higher than
the income of the potential buyers. In most cases,
therefore, purchasing a house is only feasible by means
of a long-term loan, which enables the buyer to ease
the pressure of this high price on family income. The
availability of long-term housing credit, however, not
only raises questions about its volume in relation to
demand, but also about the need for transforming
maturities on the part of the originators of these loans.
The most traditional model for mobilizing
resources for housing is the one based on intermediation
by the financial system (figure 1). It is carried out by
multi-spectrum banks or financial institutions —which
finance various activities, including housing— or, as
was in the past and is still the present case of many
Latin American countries, specialized mortgage
institutions. As a primary source of funds for this
purpose, the latter raise family savings, mainly through
relatively short-term deposits.
Loans originated by these institutions remain as
assets on their balance sheets for the entire length of
the loan. Lending institutions also take charge of
administering and collecting payments on these loans.
In other words, they perform all the functions of the
mortgage process: funding and loan origination and
servicing. That these institutions grant long-term loans
with short-term savings exposes them to potential risks
of mismatch of maturities, and possibly of rates, where
ceilings exist on mortgage interest; these risks are
concentrated in lending institutions.
In order to attract more funds to the housing
sector, taking into account that capital markets have
new investment agents and more long-term funds
available, and in order for the maturities of these
resources to match the maturities of the loans they are
financing, increasing attention is being paid to an
emerging model of resource mobilization. This model
is based on the development of a secondary mortgage
market, in which mortgages are first sold, generally to
agencies that specialize in acquiring mortgages from
various lenders, and then issue securities and bonds
which are backed by those mortgages; these are then
sold to investors (generally institutional investors) in
the capital markets (figure 2).
This process of selling of mortgages and their later
securitization makes possible, first of all, a faster
rotation of the resources being managed by lending
institutions, since these assets come off their balance
sheets before their maturity, in return for funds to
originate new loans and, secondly, the establishment
of a linkage between the housing finance and capital
markets, which facilitates the transformation of
maturities required in the former case. In the more
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sophisticated version of this model, there is a tendency
towards specialization of functions within the mortgage
process: the lending institution basically becomes a
loan originator, whose risks are transferred and spread
to the capital market, diversifying its sources of funds
and even transferring loan administration to specialized
agencies that may emerge.
Of course, the above description is overly
simplified and mainly serves to illustrate the differences
between a model of financial intermediation for housing
and a model for mobilizing resources backed by a
secondary mortgage market. Other variations also exist,
both theoretically and practically. One example would
be housing funds —generally government funds— to
provide resources to lending institutions; the latter,
under certain terms, originate mortgage loans that,
depending on the degree of development of the
markets, could be securitized or not. Another example
might be for lending institutions to raise resources
through the issue of bonds or other mortgage securities,
which would also serve to establish linkages, although
less sophisticated ones, with capital markets.2 In fact,
these and other variations have been used at different
times in a number of countries in Latin America.
There is certainly a clear trend towards reassessing
institutional schemes for mobilizing resources for the
housing sector. An attempt is being made to provide a
greater volume of residential mortgage loans and, at
the same time, to obtain resources on terms of maturity
that are compatible with housing finance. There is thus
a shift in the traditional model, limited to the financial
market, based on the mobilization of short-term family
savings for the origination of long-term mortgage
loans. But this shift does not mean discarding the
traditional model, which will remain important in the
great majority of developing countries, but rather
complementing it with a scheme for obtaining
resources from both the financial market and the capital
market, through traditional methods of attracting family
savings and mechanisms for raising institutional
savings, in order to originate mortgage loans that can
be securitized.
Ever since the origination of mortgage loans began
to be separated from the mobilization of savings from the
public, a trend has been seen towards the attraction of
general savings from the economy —whether they be
savings deposited in many different banks or in
specialized financial institutions, savings administered
by institutional investors or even savings from
abroad— to channel them in some way to housing
finance, through innovative mortgage instruments.3
This probably occurs at the expense of the mobilization
of compulsory savings specifically allocated for
FIGURE 2
Movilization of resources for ousing with a secondary market
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2
 One notable case in the region is the well-developed system of
mortgage securities (letras de crédito hipotecario) in Chile; its
consolidation was fostered by  the pension reform initiated in Chile
in 1981, which generated increasing long-term domestic savings,
as well as the emergence of life insurance companies as another
important institutional investor in these securities. 3
 See Hausmann (1998, p. 11).
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housing finance, among other reasons because of the
constraints it imposes on the amount of resources that
can be mobilized in this manner. The emerging scheme
described above should help to solve the problem of
maturities mismatch and the need to spread risk.4
2. Linkages of housing credit with direct housing
subsidies and prior savings
Housing finance institutions will have to compete for
resources in the financial and capital markets. They
will therefore require instruments that offer attractive
rates of return, to both savers and investors; thus they
will need to design mortgage instruments on market
terms. This means that housing credit amortizations
must permit the recovery of loans in real terms, to
enable the financing of a new house and the sale of
mortgages on the secondary market. It is argued that
subsidizing one family places a burden on 20 savers,
who will receive low or even negative rates of return
on their deposits, thereby providing a disincentive to
saving and hindering the growth of the financial
system.5
This objective, however, is not necessarily
compatible with the possibilities of access to mortgage
credit options by potential borrowers, mainly in the
low-income segments. The chief obstacle to solving the
housing deficit of these sectors has been precisely their
difficulty in gaining access to existing finance
opportunities, for three basic reasons: (i) their
insufficient purchasing power, which prevents them
from converting their enormous potential demand into
effective demand; (ii) their lack of adequate collateral
to qualify for a mortgage loan; and (iii) their inability,
especially in countries with large informal sectors, to
show evidence of a steady income. The combination
of prior saving/mortgage loan is clearly insufficient to
enable low-income sectors to gain access to housing,
although it may be feasible for the higher-income
strata.
Tripartite schemes have emerged to address this
problem and facilitate access to housing. Their
components are as follows: prior saving on the part of
buyers, a State-provided, non-reimbursable demand
subsidy and, where appropriate, a complementary
mortgage loan on market terms. The main objective of
the direct housing subsidy (DHS) is to supplement the
purchasing power of low-income families, a segment
where the bulk of potential housing demand is
concentrated, to allow these families to solve their
housing problems through the market by purchasing a
home that meets their goals and is compatible with
their own efforts and economic possibilities. It is
considered that demand subsidies are clearly more
efficient than supply subsidies (in the form of State-
provided housing), since they entail fewer losses in
terms of the consumer’s welfare, less detriment to the
consumer’s sovereignty and lower housing costs.6
The impact of direct housing subsidies on the
purchasing power of beneficiaries is illustrated in figure 3.7
To simplify the analysis, let us suppose that the
consumption basket of the family in question is
composed of two goods: housing and other goods.8
Given its level of (monthly) income , this family has
a feasible consumption set represented by area AOB and,
based on its preferences, chooses, for example, basket
C (it consumes OD in housing and OE in other goods).
Suppose that this family receives a housing subsidy,
by which its feasible consumption set increases and is
now represented by the area AOFG. This produces an
increase in the family’s real income that shifts the
budget line, now denoted by the line FG; this line is cut
off at point G, since the subsidy can only be used to
consume housing (the subsidy is not granted in cash
and is therefore not fungible).
Figure 3 may well represent the case of a family
receiving a direct housing subsidy under a housing
leasing program (rental with commitment to purchase)
such as the one in Chile. Since this is a subsidy granted
by the State partially and regularly over time, the
choice of the new consumption basket will most
probably be located on section HI, since the subsidy can
be added to the budget in order to purchase a better
and more expensive house (point H), or to free some
of the budget used by the beneficiary family to pay
rent, for the equivalent of the subsidy, in order to
consume more of the other goods (point I) or a
combination of the two (section HI).
Direct housing subsidies have a number of
advantages, but we will list only three here that are
4
 This trend can be seen in the contents of some recently introduced
reforms in the legal and institutional frameworks for housing finance
in a number of countries in the region.
5
 See Renaud (1997, p. 13).
6
 See Renaud (1997, pp. 3-4).
7
 See Gonzales Arrieta (1999) for a detailed explanation of the
economic rationale of direct housing subsidies.
8
 According to Hicks’s Composite Commodity Theorem, a group
of goods whose relative prices do not vary may be treated as one
commodity.
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directly related to the development of the mortgage
market.9 In the first place, these subsidies help to
expand the potential market of mortgage borrowers, by
reducing the amount of indebtedness needed to make
up the price of the housing being purchased. They
therefore allow recipient families, with no increase in
their income, to obtain mortgage loans that meet their
capacity to pay. In addition, the lower indebtedness
made possible by these subsidies may stimulate the
formal financial system to increase the volume of
housing loans to the low-income sectors, and may also
offer a better-quality loan portfolio: the borrowers are
assuming obligations that will be easier to pay back,
given their level of income, since the coverage of the
mortgage guarantee will yield a surplus over the debt
(equivalent to the amount of the subsidy).
Secondly, direct housing subsidies, as part of the
above-mentioned tripartite scheme to facilitate access
to housing, may stimulate the formation of family
savings channelled through the formal financial system,
if they are designed to reward the amount saved and
the duration, steadiness and regularity of the prior
saving process. This is true when regular prior saving
is a requirement for granting such subsidies. In turn,
the formation of prior savings through the financial
system may help to expand the base of potential
borrowers, incorporating groups that are traditionally
rejected because of their inability to demonstrate a
steady income.
Thirdly, direct housing subsidies, unlike interest
rate subsidies, strengthen rather than distort the
operation of the housing finance market. They
complement, rather than displace, the mortgage loan
on market terms; hence, for segments with some
indebtedness capacity, the counterpart of a direct
housing subsidy would be a mortgage transaction on
the same terms. The validity of a subsidy mechanism
of this type is therefore perfectly consistent with a
housing resource mobilization scheme with positive
real interest rates, both for savings and for loans, that
stimulates both the flow of financial resources to the
sector and the capitalization of financial intermediaries.
9
 Direct housing subsidies have other important advantages,
especially in terms of equity —they allow for better targeting and
progressivity— and in terms of encouraging the efforts and
capabilities of the beneficiaries to choose their housing solution.
See Gonzales Arrieta (1999, pp. 142-143).
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Strengthening of mortgage instruments:
policy recommendations
1. General overview in Latin America
The validity and effectiveness of mortgage instruments
are based on two premises: on the one hand, the
possibility of mobilizing long-term resources for
housing finance and, on the other, the possibility of
designing mortgage products that help families with
indebtedness capacity gain access to housing.
Clearly, the mobilization of long-term resources
for housing finance systems is a pending task in most
Latin American countries. Countries like Brazil, with
its former Housing Finance System (SFH); Colombia,
with its now abolished system based on the constant
unit of purchasing power (UPAC); Costa Rica, with its
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National Housing Finance System (SFNV); and the
Dominican Republic, with the Dominican Savings and
Loan System for Housing, to name only a few,
primarily support long-term mortgage loans with
resources, largely short-term, from the financial
markets. The SFH in Brazil uses the so-called
cadernetas de poupança, an instrument for raising
savings deposits on call whose real growth, since 1981,
has tended to be lower than non-monetary financial
assets; moreover, these deposits have been very
volatile, and a rigid scheme prevails for investing
resources raised by this means. In Costa Rica, one of
the main weaknesses of mutual-type savings and loan
institutions, which are part of the SFNV, is the maturities
mismatch between funding —mainly short-term family
savings— and long-term lending. This traditional
system of financing long-term loans with short-term
savings is potentially vulnerable, because of the risk
of mismatching maturities and rates.
Other countries rely on compulsory savings —for
example, the Fondo de Garantía por Tiempo de
Servicios [Unemployment Insurance Fund] (FGTS) in
Brazil, or the payroll deductions in the Instituto del
Fondo Nacional de Vivienda para los Trabajadores
[National Workers’ Housing Fund Institute] (INFONAVIT)
and other funds in Mexico— or on the setting up of
State-provided funds intermediated by the financial
system, such as the Banco Ecuatoriano de la Vivienda
[Ecuadorian Housing Bank] (BEV), the former Fondo
de Operación y Financiamiento Bancario a la Vivienda
[Bank Operation and Finance Fund for Housing] (FOVI)
in Mexico, whose functions are now performed by the
Sociedad Hipotecaria Federal [Federal Mortgage
Company] (SHF),10 or the Fondo Mivivienda , the State
housing programme in Peru. In addition to the
constraints these mechanisms may impose on the
amount of available resources, dependence on this type
of resources often makes it difficult for lending
institutions to sustain themselves. In Brazil, since FGTS
deposits largely depend on variables such as
employment level, purchasing power of wages and
participation in formal employment, there has been an
increased decapitalization of the Fund and some
destabilization of housing credit in times of poor
macroeconomic performance. In Peru, it is clear that
the initial investment of the Fondo Mivivienda,
including its loan repayments and profitability, will be
insufficient to meet the sustained needs for housing
finance.11
Since housing finance and access to housing are
only available through long-term loans to creditworthy
families, the financial engineering of mortgage
origination requires a transformation of maturities.
Accordingly, linkages must be created between the
housing finance market and the capital market, offering
housing finance systems, in principle, the possibility
of making resources available in amounts and terms
that financial intermediation alone cannot provide. The
development of a secondary mortgage market is the
vehicle by which this linkage is established between
the housing finance system and the capital market.
In Latin America a number of legal, institutional
and operational initiatives are being taken to link
housing finance systems with capital markets in order
to attract long-term resources for housing. Where long-
term resources (savings) and institutional investors
exist, as they do in many countries to a greater or lesser
extent, one way of achieving this goal is through
mortgage securitization. To cite some examples, in
Brazil the establishment of the Real Estate Finance
System (SFI) clearly incorporates this idea; in
Colombia the new law regulating sector development
includes instruments to establish such linkages; in
Mexico some legal reforms and the creation of the
Sociedad Hipotecaria Federal [Federal Mortgage
Company] (SHF) seek to create favourable conditions
for securitization; and in Ecuador and Peru there is a
legal framework and institutional setting to allow for
securitization.
A crucial prerequisite for the development of
secondary mortgage markets is the existence of sound
primary markets to form the basis for the design of
products to facilitate access to the capital market; also,
it is required that the latter have long-term resources
available. Experience in this area, however, shows that
this process is only beginning —today only six
countries in the region (Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico and Panama) have issued mortgage-
backed securities— in part because of weaknesses in
the primary mortgage markets themselves but also
because of a series of difficulties, particularly the recent
financial crises that have downgraded mortgage credit
10
 Note that the ability of SHF to grant loans may not be extended
beyond 12 October 2009.
11
 In line with this reality, the Fondo Mivivienda  has been working
on the design of a guarantee scheme and other products to stimulate
resource mobilization from other sources, including the capital
market.
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portfolios and created uncertainty for long-term
financial investments. Mortgage securitization is not
the only way, however, to establish linkages between
the housing finance and capital markets. For many
years Chile has been setting up these linkages through
the use of mortgage securities , an instrument that
dominates the Chilean mortgage market and is highly
liquid, in addition to fully backing the assets and
liabilities of the issuing institutions. In Chile,
securitization is being used to create additional linkages
with the capital market, an action that helps, in
particular, to mitigate the risks of other instruments,
such as endorsable mortgage credits and housing
leasing contracts.
As noted above, there is a clear trend towards
mobilizing the general saving of the economy for
housing finance, that is, not only family savings in
financial institutions but also the savings of institutional
investors who participate in the capital markets. In order
to continue competing in the financial market and start
doing so in the capital market, the housing finance
system must use instruments (such as deposits,
mortgages and bonds) isolated from subsidy
components. The need for housing finance systems to
grant mortgage loans on market terms, without subsidies,
is closely related to the possibilities for these systems
to establish linkages with the capital markets, in order
to broaden their fund-raising and improve risk
management. Likewise, in order to strengthen the
capacity of a housing finance system to attract more
family savings through the financial system, these
savings must earn a positive real rate of return, which
not only prevents their depreciation over time, but also
makes this option preferable to others. Such a condition
would be incompatible with an arrangement whereby the
institutions that attract family savings granted loans that
included a subsidy, if the point is to ensure that housing
finance instruments are self-sustainable in the long run.
In the light of the foregoing, in addition to
providing long-term resources to the primary mortgage
market, the criterion of profitability must prevail in
order to ensure the emergence and permanence of
mortgage credit. Amortization schemes must be
designed to ensure the recovery of loans in real terms.
This aim is important not only to rule out hidden
subsidies, but also to prevent the decapitalization of
intermediaries and to make it possible for portfolio
recovery to be the primary source of resources for
housing finance systems. In this context, various
indexation models have been implemented in Latin
America, in particular to counteract the adverse effects
of inflation. To list some examples, Chile, Colombia
and Mexico use an inflation-based scheme for indexed
loans, while in Ecuador and Peru, mortgages are fully
or primarily dollarized. On the other hand, Costa Rica
and the Dominican Republic grant housing loans in
local currency at variable rates.
While it is true that inflation is currently not a
major economic problem in the region, any long-term
financial instrument, such as a mortgage loan, will have
better possibilities for success if it is associated with
an indexation scheme that protects it against the risks
of inflation and devaluation; in other words, that helps
to “insure” it. Moreover, countries with a long tradition
in the use of this scheme, such as Chile, are not even
remotely considering the possibility of giving up
indexation, despite a sustained period of price stability.
Of course, no indexation system is a guarantee in the
face of runaway inflation or devaluation; in fact, many
of these schemes have failed in such situations. As for
indexation, it has yet to be determined how to guard
against or compensate for possible borrower default
when wages fail to keep up with inflation (if indexation
is inflation-based) or devaluation (if loans are
dollarized).
The above-mentioned conditions, aimed at
ensuring the profitability and self-sustainability of
housing finance systems, should provide access to
housing through a combination of prior saving and
long-term mortgage loans. This does not necessarily
mean, however, that all segments of the population, in
particularly low-income groups, will have full access
to the opportunities created by the operation of a
housing finance system in such conditions. Therefore,
in order to develop sound housing finance systems in
developing societies with relatively low incomes and
large segments with scant purchasing power, such as
those prevailing in Latin America,12 it is essential to
establish a clear separation between subsidies and
financing. Attempts to use a housing finance mechanism
that includes a subsidy (for example, on loan interest
rates) in order to help low-income segments gain
access to housing have generally not achieved the
anticipated results and, on the contrary, have
12
 ECLAC (2001) notes that l0% of higher-income households in Latin
American and Caribbean countries earn, out of total income, an
average of 19 times more than is earned by 40% of lower-income
households. Moreover, between two thirds and three quarters of the
population, depending on the country, earn a lower per capita income
than the overall average. Thus, in the 1990s the region had the
most unequal distribution of income in the world.
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undermined the self-sustainability of the housing
finance system.
Accordingly, another pending task is to determine
how to harmonize profitability criteria, which favour
the development of a self-sustainable housing finance
system, with the criterion of borrowers’ access to
housing and protection of their ability to pay. The
available mortgage instruments in the housing finance
markets of a number of countries are usually accessible
to the relatively higher income strata but rarely help
promote access for those with a limited capacity to pay.
SHF loans in Brazil, where resources from short-term
savings are used, are granted to upper-middle-income
families (earning more than US$ 1,000 a month). In
Chile, where endorsable mortgage certificates are
actively used for financing higher-priced housing, the
average value of accumulated loans under this
instrument, operated by endorsable mortgage loan
administrators, was US$ 37,000. About 37% of total
loans granted by the Housing Finance Programme
(PROFIVI) in Mexico, formerly administered by FOVI and
now by SHF, go to households with ranges of monthly
income between US$ 780 and US$ 1,300, and 35% to
those earning between US$ 1,300 and US$ 1,950. The
average loan amount from the Fondo Mivivienda in
Peru is about US$ 18,000, which means that these
funds are basically reaching families with monthly
incomes of US$ 530 to US$ 585.
In public policy in Latin America there is, in fact,
a fairly widespread tendency to recognize that a
combination of saving and a mortgage loan (on market
terms) is insufficient to meet the housing needs of large
segments of the population, since for some time now
nearly all the countries of the region have had direct
housing subsidy schemes that represent a cornerstone
of public policy and are designed to make up for the
housing deficit in the low-income sectors.
2. The role of the State in the creation of a
mortgage market
State participation is crucial to this pending task. For
many years the State has been actively involved in the
housing sector, seeking to help the low-income sectors;
however, this State participation has often displaced the
private sector and, ultimately, has failed to reach the
target population. More recently, in Latin America
there has been a tendency for the State to withdraw
from the direct building and financing of housing, and
to begin playing a basically regulatory role as well as
promoting private initiative. Some experiences, such
as those of Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Mexico,
bear witness to this change of focus and seem to
indicate a move in the right direction. But these same
experiences also reveal certain shortcomings: for
example, in schemes of this nature it has not always
been possible to attract private-sector participation in
the granting of small mortgage loans. This means that
in low-income societies, where broad sectors of the
population have little purchasing power, the State is
necessary not only to act as a regulator but also to help
provide these sectors with greater access to housing.
To ensure that this participation does not displace
private initiative but rather reinforces the self-
sustainability of housing finance systems, various
instruments must be considered.
In general, in the case of low-income sectors,
opportunities for access to housing should be based on
a combination of up to three elements: (i) prior saving
of the buyers, or some indication of their own effort,
not necessarily monetary in nature, in the case of the
lowest-income strata; (ii) a direct, non-reimbursable
State subsidy, in support of housing demand; and (iii)
a long-term mortgage loan on market terms as a
supplement to help the more creditworthy strata.
Obviously, while a combination of savings and a
mortgage loan should be enough for families with
sufficient capacity to pay to have access to housing,
in the poorest sectors, with no capacity to pay, access
to housing should fundamentally depend on State
support in the form of a direct subsidy (for example,
basic or partly self-built housing), with perhaps the
addition of some component of saving or family effort.
From this standpoint, the direct housing subsidy
mechanism should be used as leverage to convert the
potential demand for housing into actual demand,
without introducing distortions in the operation of the
housing finance market; to that end, the portion of the
housing market that lacks sufficient capacity to pay and
needs a State subsidy must be differentiated from the
portion having the capacity to pay, which can be
reached by private intermediaries through market
mechanisms. Furthermore, as already noted, the direct
housing subsidy may contribute to the growth of the
potential market of mortgage borrowers by reducing the
amount of indebtedness needed to make up the price
of the dwelling; the exception is the case of the poorest
population, which can be offered a housing solution by
combining prior saving with a State subsidy. A review
of the experience in the region clearly shows that this
mechanism is an integral part of the housing policies
of a growing number of countries.
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Of course, the award of a direct housing subsidy
is not enough to guarantee that private financial
institutions will give supplementary mortgage loans to
the beneficiary population or, more generally, to the
lowest income strata. Moreover, the lack of mortgage
credit to complement the State subsidy has undermined
the effectiveness of the latter instrument, since it raises
the proportion of subsidies that are granted but not paid
out. In this context, the Latin American experience also
sheds light on other promising channels of State
intervention, provided that the purpose is not to distort
the operation of the housing finance market. One of
these, for example, is the mortgage loan scheme with
preferential interest rates, as used by mortgage banks
in Panama.
This mechanism works as follows: lenders
originate mortgages at market interest rates, but qualify
potential borrowers at preferential interest rates (i.e.,
below market rates) in order to give more families
access to these loans. To cover the difference between
the two rates, the Government grants the lenders tax
credits that are tradable on a secondary market.
Mortgages are originated at the referential rate,
calculated and published by the National Banking
Commission and based on the average mortgage rate
offered by the five banks with the largest mortgage
portfolios in the system. The mechanism is applied to
mortgage loans of up to US$ 62,500 in two tranches:
the first is for housing worth up to US$ 25,000, for
which the Government guarantees the lender a 5%
reimbursement (in tax credits); the second tranche
includes housing priced between US$ 25,000 and
US$ 62,500, in which case the Government grants a
4% reimbursement. The financial intermediary applies
to the Government for reimbursement at the end of the
year, depending on the value of the mortgages granted.
The borrower accordingly pays a preferential rate,
defined as the difference between the referential
(market) rate and the rate to be reimbursed by the
Government (4 or 5%, depending on the case).
Employers may deduct the monthly payments from the
borrowers’ pay and then remit the payments to the
lending institutions; this will help improve debt
repayment, especially in the case of relatively small
mortgage loans.
Note that, in this case, there is no borrower
subsidy at the expense of the decapitalization of the
lending institution, as has been (and still is) the usual
practice in many countries. Actually, the institution
grants mortgages at market rates, since the State covers
the difference in rates with tradable tax credits.
Although the scheme is less progressive than the direct
housing subsidy —since the bigger the loan, the bigger
the subsidy— it has proved to be effective not only in
stimulating mortgage loan activity in Panama, but also
in creating a mortgage stock that is fully securitizable
and attractive to the capital market. In other words, a
product has been created in the primary mortgage
market for the establishment of linkages with the
capital market, in order to channel long-term resources
to housing finance. In fact, in Panama a high proportion
of the underlying assets in the issue of mortgage-
backed securities is represented by loans originated
under the Act on Preferential Interest Rates.
Another form of State intervention is the
allocation of subsidies to financial institutions to cover
the proportionately higher fixed costs they incur in
granting and administering small mortgages. Although
this mechanism should theoretically promote a greater
availability of small mortgages for creditworthy
families, it has only been applied in Chile, and for a
short time. It is one of the innovations being applied
under the new Chilean housing policy since early 2002,
with a view to stimulating greater participation by
private lenders in mortgage loans to supplement direct
housing subsidies and also to relieve the State of the
task of granting and administering small loans, in
which it has a poor record. Low-income Chilean
families have had limited access to the housing credit
options offered in the market.13 In this situation, the
State has acted, in practice, as an active mortgage
lender for low-income segments that qualify for the
Basic Housing Program of the Ministry of Housing and
Urban Development (MINVU). Authors such as Pardo
(1998) and Rojas (1999) found that the State’s
performance in this area was considered highly
unsatisfactory. It is estimated that even after many
renegotiations, more than 60% of the Ministry’s
mortgage portfolio includes more than three overdue
payments, and default represents virtually three
quarters of hidden subsidies.14
Furthermore, Latin American experience shows
that State guarantees aimed at partially covering the
credit risk involved in home mortgages may stimulate
the participation of private-sector financial institutions.
This type of guarantee is generally linked to State
housing funds. In Mexico, SHF gives financial
13 See Rojas and Greene (1995, pp. 31-49).
14
 See (Almarza (2000, pp. 237-257). Note that in Chile, beginning
in 2002, an incentive policy has been applied to reduce past due
indebtedness, which has had considerable success.
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intermediaries a guarantee against borrower default; if
the borrower fails to pay, SHF covers the first loss for
up to 25% of the unpaid debt, for which it charges a
premium. Likewise, financial intermediaries operating
with the Fondo Mivivienda in Peru receive credit risk
coverage amounting to one third of the loan, being in
addition a subordinated coverage (that is, the bank
recovers its first two thirds, and the Fondo Mivivienda
recovers the remaining third). Accordingly, as is being
done in some countries, the possibility of establishing
mortgage insurance in the region more widely should
be explored, to protect lenders against potential losses
as a result of default, on the one hand, and to enable
borrowers to obtain mortgage loans with a lower down
payment, on the other.
The proper management of inflation-indexed
mortgages, or in some countries dollarized mortgages,
given the intrinsic long-term horizon of mortgage
loans, entails the requirement of ensuring adequate
protection of the borrower’s capacity to pay throughout
the term of the loan. Thus it will also be important for
the State to establish some kind of mechanism to
compensate for any borrower’s inability to pay
resulting from the lag of wages behind inflation, where
the latter is the indexation factor, or devaluation, where
the loans are dollarized.
Since 1999, a type of mortgage has been used in
Mexico with a guarantee against systemic risk that
covers a possible sudden or permanent collapse in the
minimum real wage, enabling borrowers to pay, in
minimum wage terms, a mortgage denominated in
investment units (UDI).15 The instrument devised to
ensure that loan payments increase only in proportion
to the minimum wage, even though the loan is
denominated in investment units, is a swap, currently
offered by SHF (formerly offered by FOVI) through the
financial intermediaries. The cost of coverage is shared
between the borrower and the Federal Government: the
former pays a premium of 71 base points, which is
combined with a bank line of credit backed by the
Federal Government, creating a fund to cover
temporary shortages of funds and guard against deep
recessions.16 This fund is designed to withstand a real
deterioration in wages of 25% for up to 30 years. If
the deterioration is greater, SHF will have losses; if less,
the fund will see a profit. This is a practical example
that combines State participation with the beneficiaries’
commitment to sharing the cost of this type of
insurance, adding a premium to the interest rate paid
by the borrower.
Another step the State could take in order to
promote the operation of a deeper mortgage market
would be to act as a second-tier bank. Latin American
experience reveals the ineffectiveness of the State as
a direct lender: available funds have not reached the
neediest population, and the coverage of these loans
has not been very successful. On the other hand, the
institutional schemes of second-tier banks, which exist
in a number of countries in the region (Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Mexico and Peru, among others), may be
more efficient instruments for procuring resources for
loan originators and stimulating the formation and
consolidation of a housing finance market.
In Costa Rica, the Banco Hipotecario de la
Vivienda (BANHVI) is a publicly-owned financial
institution which acts as the leading agency for the
National Housing Finance System (SFNV) as a second-
tier bank. The strategy used in setting up SFNV was to
combine a subsidy with an increased ability to purchase
mortgages on the part of BANHVI, so that the financial
intermediaries could commit themselves to substantial
financing operations, thereby mitigating potential
problems of liquidity and mismatch of maturities. In
the first years of SFNV, the mortgage discount capacity
of BANHVI not only represented one of the biggest
sources of funds for savings and loan associations, but
also accounted for a good part of the strength of the
system.17 In the 1990s, however, funds became more
scarce, and for nearly a decade BANHVI has virtually
discontinued the use of this mechanism, making it more
difficult to stimulate loan activity, especially for
creditworthy sectors already receiving the subsidy.
For its part, the Banco Ecuatoriano de la Vivienda
[Ecuadorian Housing Bank] (BEV) was restructured in
1998 and converted into a second-tier bank, geared to
supporting the building and financing of housing by
refinancing the mortgage portfolios of private-sector
financial institutions, but no longer having a direct
relationship with the final beneficiaries. After
performing these functions for some years, BEV, as a
second-tier bank, must now face the challenge of
expanding its rediscount operations and reducing costs
17
 From 1989 to 1992, BANHVI completed an annual average of
more than 7,000 mortgage rediscount operations. See Zawadzki
(1994, p. 40).
15
 The investment unit (UDI) is a unit of account whose value is
estimated by the Bank of Mexico (the country’s central bank) and
is adjusted daily according to inflation.
16
 See Zepeda (2000, pp. 30-35).
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in order to become a source of funding capable of
increasing the supply of mortgage credit.
In Mexico, SHF handles several credit products,
acting as second-tier mortgage lender. These include
lines of credit to financial intermediaries for housing
purchase, although this scheme will expire in a few
years. After the “tequila crisis” in 1994-1995, the so-
called sociedades financieras de objeto limitado
(SOFOLES), or specialized financial institutions, began
to play an important role as mortgage institutions;
today they channel nearly 96% of the funds granted by
SHF, and also handle markets that previously had no
access to mortgage loans from private financial
intermediaries.18 Note that, under the law creating it,
SHF will retain the authority to grant loans only until
12 October 2009, after which it may influence the
market only through the granting of guarantees. One
function that SHF can perform (which its predecessor,
FOVI, could not) is to help the SOFOLES finance
themselves directly, through bank lines of credit or
through the securities market, backed by a guarantee
of timely payment granted by SHF.
This role as a second-tier lender entails, for
example, the extension of lines of credit, including the
contracting of external credits, a mortgage rediscount
mechanism and the issue of mortgage securities in the
capital market. Through this mechanism, it is generally
possible to make a certain amount of funds available
to the mortgage market on more favourable terms —in
respect of maturities and cost— not only providing
incentive to the participation of private lenders but also,
in principle, reaching segments of the population with
a more limited capacity to pay.
In addition to the above-mentioned ways of
arranging for the State to act as a second-tier bank, as
being practised to a greater or lesser extent in a number
of countries in the region, the trend towards the creation
of secondary mortgage markets —which is crucial, as
we have seen, for ensuring the transformation of
maturities required for housing finance— also expands
State participation as a catalyst of the housing finance
market. Many years ago, for example, the State played
an important role in Chile as a market maker in the
negotiation of mortgage securities. In the case of
mortgage-backed securities, the State’s actions may be
crucial in promoting standardization in the primary
mortgage market on the basis of incentives to encourage
originators and other participating agents to meet
certain standards that will help to create a stock of
securitizable mortgages. For example, since 1998 the
Central Bank of the Argentine Republic has been
encouraging the financial intermediaries to use a
standardized contract to originate mortgages, while in
Mexico, SHF, acting as guarantee provider, is promoting
standardization of both documents and procedures for
originating and collecting mortgage loans.
The provision of State guarantees supporting the
issue of mortgage-backed securities and bonds,
especially those including mortgages for low-income
borrowers, may help to improve the creditworthiness
of these instruments. In Colombia, this is the purpose
of Titularizadora Colombiana, a secondary mortgage
market institution; in Mexico, a prime role is assigned
to SHF as an insurance provider for mortgage-backed
issues; and in Peru, the fundamental law of the Fondo
Mivivienda was amended to permit it to guarantee
mortgage-related securities issued or managed by
financial institutions or securitization companies.
Since the housing deficit in the low-income
sectors is often qualitative in nature, these sectors
accord high priority to improving existing housing.
Housing finance needs are thus related to smaller loans
on shorter terms, which do not necessarily have a
mortgage as collateral. Accordingly, it may be helpful
to promote micro-finance options that can be used to
meet this type of credit needs. In the Dominican
Republic, for example, some initiatives for granting
micro-credits have emerged, administered by savings
and loan associations, to improve housing in low-
income neighbourhoods. In addition, the Banco
Nacional de Fomento de la Vivienda y la Producción
[National Housing and Industrial Development Bank]
(BNV) has established a micro-finance fund to improve
and expand housing, whose funds will be channelled
through non-governmental organizations that promote
micro-credit, and through grassroots groups. The
soundness of the financing will be based on managed,
ongoing supervision, rather than on the existence of
real guarantees; finance programmes will be offered to
improve and repair housing, and hence small loans will
be provided (US$ 1,500 to US$ 2,000 on average).
Managed and cooperative self-construction housing
schemes will also be promoted, operating on market
terms, so that the existing resources in the formal sector
can be applied in the informal sector. Although
experiences of this type are still in the early stages in
the Dominican Republic, and in general in the region,
the financial product described has an enormous market
potential; moreover, because these are short- and18
 See Obregón (2001, pp. 49-56).
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medium-term loans, there may be a better
correspondence between the traditional modalities for
raising and lending funds, and because there has been
prior investment in a housing, the debt ratio is more
favourable, if the property serves as collateral.
Finally, with the continuing aim of making
housing loans more accessible to the low-income
population, it is important to design products to
stimulate prior saving for housing through the financial
system in order to expand the base of potential
borrowers by incorporating groups that are traditionally
rejected because of their inability to demonstrate a
steady income. In Chile, for example, the requirement
of prior saving in order to qualify for a State subsidy
has been a powerful tool in creating a significant
volume of financial savings in small amounts. In
Mexico, through regular savings plans, a financial
history can be built that will allow the families involved
to demonstrate their credit eligibility and, at the same
time, make a down payment on the loan that will later
be approved . More recently, in Peru, similar savings
programmes have been set up as a prerequisite for
applying for direct subsidy programs and supplementary
loans. These programmes not only help to identify but
also to “qualify” borrowers. In this way, a wide
segment of the self-employed population, which
represents a significant portion of the potential demand
for housing, may be attracted to the mortgage market.
